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The Russians explained
that the capture of Berlin was to be a "secondary effort". Yet,
prior to April, 1945, the Russians had been marshalling their forces
along the east bank of the Oder River, some 33 miles east of Berlin.
The number of troops would grow to 1,200,000 personnel, including
the tremendous numbers of tanks, over 22,000 artillery pieces, and
other related equipment, before they began their assault on April
16, 1945, a month earlier than they had told Eisenhower.
Additionally, from the Oder River westward to Berlin, the geography
favored the Russians, in that it was dry and flat. At the time the
Russians began their assault on Berlin, the Americans, who had
reached the Elbe River on April 11th, at Magdeburg, only 50 miles
from Berlin, had only 50,000 troops available for the push on
Berlin. However, the word not to cross the Elbe River, except for
short (five-mile) patrols did not seem to filter down to the
American ground forces, or seemed to have been ignored. By April 17,
the U.S. 2nd Armored ("Hell On Wheels") Division's 17th Armored
Engineered Battalion constructed a bridge across the Elbe River at
Magdeburg against increasing German resistance, including the
Luftwaffe. The 2nd Armored had covered over 200 miles, from the
Rhine River, in only 14 days. The same day, the U.S. 30th (Old
Hickory) and 83rd (Thunderbolt) Infantry Divisions also crossed the
Elbe River, just 6 miles south of Magdeburg at Barby, again meeting
stiffening resistance. The 234th and 295th Engineer Combat
Battalions, supported by the 992nd Engineer Treadway Bridge Company,
built two bridges used by the two divisions. The Germans tried
everything, including frogmen, to destroy the bridges, but were
unsuccessful. Due to an inability to get heavy armored equipment
across, the 2nd Armored Division's bridgehead at Magdeburg was lost,
but Barby held. The 2nd Armored moved to Barby, out of the range of
the German artillery, and crossed the Elbe. Just two days later, the
divisions received word that there was to be no drive to Berlin and
no advance beyond the Elbe. (3) The word was not heeded. On April
25th, patrol elements led by Lieutenant William D. Robertson of the
U.S. 273rd Infantry Regiment, 69th Infantry Division, crossed the
Elbe River at Torgau and met Russian troops in the first
American-Russian linkup. On April 30th, U.S. troops of the 113th
Cavalry Group met Russian forces at Zerbst, east of Barby.
Additionally, contact was made by the U.S. 121st Infantry regiment,
8th Infantry Division, at Apollensdorf, also on April 30th.
Montgomery, dilatory as ever, was making particularly slow progress
in his drive to the Baltic. Eisenhower, in an effort to speed him,
gave him the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps. A series of meetings on
April 22nd and 23rd, between Montgomery and Lieutenant General
Matthew Ridgeway, the commander of the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps,
helped speed up Montgomery's elaborately planned and defined Elbe
River crossings. Eisenhower was concerned that the Russians may take
Berlin, and keep right on going through to Denmark. Ridgeway's first
contribution was determining which U.S. Army units were available.
He chose the crack 82nd Airborne Division, which already had 10
river assault crossings in the European theater. Ridgeway also chose
General Bryant Moore's 8th Infantry Division, which had impressed
Ridgeway with its' performance in the Ruhr Valley earlier. The
battle-tested 7th Armored Division, commanded by General Robert
Hasbrouck, which had fought so well with the 82nd Airborne in the
"Battle of the Bulge", was also selected for the effort. The veteran
British 6th Airborne Division, commanded by General Eric Bols,
rounded out the Allied assault forces, and already had been staging
near Lauenberg, where Montgomery had been planning to initiate the
river crossings. The 15th Scottish Division had attacked north and
east across the river on April 29th, meeting light to moderate
opposition, and secured a bridgehead about 5 miles wide and 8 miles
deep by the end of the day. Ridgeway, also concerned with
Montgomery's legendary planning, surveyed an area north of
Lauenberg, at Bleckede-Wrestedt. Ridgeway, who personally
reconnoitered the west bank, observed that the Germans were willing
to resist, but were not organized to defend against a river
crossing. What were the remnants of German Army Group Vistula,
commanded by General Der Panzertruppen Baron Hasso von Mantuffel,
was the only organized defense in this area. The rest of the German
defenses were Volksturm. Ridgeway also decided that the river
crossings should proceed immediately, before the Germans were able
to mount a river defense. Ridgeway's main problem was that the 82nd
Airborne Division's engineers were not with the division. Two
engineer groups, the veteran 1143rd and the 1130th, were quickly
brought up. Each engineer group consisted of at least four engineer
battalions. The 1143rd was commanded by General Donald Phelan, and
the 1130th by General James Green. Continued |
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